PublishedOctober 30, 2025

Step 1: Destroy IPR.  Step 2: ???  Step 3: Profit.

Last week, the USPTO issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) containing major changes to the institution process for inter partes review.  Combined with other changes made by the USPTO, including the illegal “settled expectations” doctrine effectively barring review of a patent more than six years after issue, the net impact of the NPRM if adopted as proposed would be to effectively render the inter partes review (IPR) process a dead letter.

What’s in the NPRM?

The NPRM has three main provisions.  I will refer to them as the stipulation, estoppel, and abandonment provisions.

Stipulation

By far the least offensive of the three provisions, which is faint praise, is the stipulation provision.  This requires a petitioner to bind themselves not to bring any § 102 or § 103 invalidity challenges in any other forum if the USPTO grants institution of their petition, which includes challenges that the IPR process is barred from considering, such as product prior art.  Only if the petitioner makes this stipulation will the USPTO even consider instituting IPR.

So in order to take advantage of the Congressionally-created IPR process, petitioners are required to prospectively give up their ability to defend themselves in other fora.  The NPRM justifies this by noting that patent owners “spend substantial funds defending their rights against multiple or duplicative challenges, which would be avoided under the proposed rule.”  But nowhere does it require a patent owner to make a similar stipulation in order to have the petition denied—the patent owner remains free to assert their patent in multiple courts without any restrictions.  

If duplication is truly the essence of the concern, then the patent owner should also be required to stipulate that they will bring infringement claims in only a single court, and that they will agree to a litigation stay if institution is granted.  But that’s not the rule being proposed—it binds, but does not benefit, petitioners, and benefits, but does not bind, patent owners.

Estoppel

The second provision bars consideration of a petition if any challenged claim—or an independent claim from which a challenged claim depends—has been found not invalid in a court case, an ITC decision, or another USPTO review.  But this provision fundamentally misunderstands patent law.  

That’s because patents are never found valid.  Instead, they are found “not invalid” over a particular combination of prior art.  Even if a patent is not invalid over the Fu and Barr prior art, that fact has no bearing on whether it is not invalid over the Einstein and Rosen prior art.  The questions are completely unrelated—but this provision treats them as meaningfully linked, to the point where petitions would be denied because someone else, at some point in the patent’s life, challenged it and failed.  Your access to a Congressionally-designed process would be revoked because of someone else’s actions—actions you had no involvement with or control over.

Just as problematic, it applies to petitions where even a single challenged claim overlaps with any previously reviewed claim—or with an independent claim from which the challenged claim depends.  Even if your challenge is meritorious as to nineteen claims, a single overlapping claim would prevent the PTAB from even considering reviewing the other nineteen.  This is flatly contrary to Congressional intent as summarized in the Supreme Court’s SAS decision, which states that the AIA “anticipates a regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all.”  Here, the inverse is true—a single claim with prior review is claimed to justify reviewing none.

What’s worse, this provision seems to be designed to incentivize abusive litigation tactics in order to obtain immunity from IPR.  In a 1791 letter to Hugh Williamson, who was working on early patent legislation, Thomas Jefferson discussed the problem of who should be allowed to contest a patent.  Jefferson notes that if you “make the first trial against the patentee conclusive against all others who might be interested to contest his patent” then the patent owner “will always have a collusive suit brought against himself at once.”  (This was not considered to be a good thing.)

This provision makes the first trial against the patentee conclusive against all others.  It will be abused in exactly the way Jefferson predicted.  (And if you think patentees would never pay someone to behave in ways that manipulate the law in order to protect their patents, I invite you to read about pay-for-delay.)  And while the rule claims it will allow institution in the case of a collusive petition, in practice it will be impossible for a petitioner to prove this to be the case.  They will have no ability to obtain evidence of this sort of behavior in the timespan that IPR is available within.  And so this provision will effectively operate to bar a second review even if the earlier review was collusive and intentionally weak.

Abandonment

The final provision says that the USPTO will not institute a petition if a district court or ITC trial, or another IPR, will occur before the final written decision date for the IPR

This is effectively codifying the NHK/Fintiv decisions—but only the trial date factor.  The Fintiv factors are named after the Fintiv precedential decision.  That decision denied the institution of an IPR petition, in large part because the trial was scheduled to occur before the date of the final written decision.  This has numerous problems.

First and simplest: trial dates are simply not reliable.  The Fintiv petition was filed in 2019.  The USPTO denied it in 2020.  The trial was finally supposed to occur in 2025, four years after a final written decision would have been issued.  (Following a negative ruling from the trial judge, Fintiv dropped the case entirely, only to refile it in a different court.)  But the USPTO denied hearing the petition based on… the trial date occurring first.

Second: there’s no requirement that the other matter involve the petitioner.  As with the estoppel provision, this creates an incentive for abusive litigation.  Sue a small company first and allow that lawsuit to block any IPR attempts coming from your real, deeper-pocketed targets.  And that approach doesn’t even require the sort of collusive behavior that the NPRM claims would justify institution.  The rule just incentivizes patent owners to target small businesses first.

Third: Congress always intended IPR to operate in parallel with district court litigation.  In fact, the House Report on the AIA states that the bill is intended to “limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”  In other words, Congress intended the IPR process to be a first choice over litigation, not one that was only available in the event litigation wasn’t happening.

So why “abandonment”—what’s being abandoned?  The USPTO’s Congressional obligations to operate an effective IPR program.  Instead of providing the efficient and accurate alternative to litigation that Congress intended, this provision would allow the USPTO to say ‘not my problem’ and defer to courts based purely on timing.

Cui Bono?

So who benefits from destroying IPR?  Primarily, it’s patent trolls.  About two-thirds of all IPRs in the technology industry target patents owned by, and already asserted by, trolls.  (Trolls bring approximately 85% of all district court litigation in high technology.)  Eliminating this effective and efficient route for review of patent validity benefits trolls by making invalidation of weak patents more difficult and making patent cases more expensive.  But secondarily, it’s the private equity and hedge funds that engage in litigation funding—treating patent litigation as a financial instrument to be exploited for profit, rather than as a form of industrial policy aimed at encouraging innovation.  That practice gins up litigation that wouldn’t otherwise exist purely for the profits of the funder, a practice known as champerty—a practice which used to be illegal.  

And who’s hurt by it?  The productive, innovative companies that are emblematic of American leadership in technology.

Why is the USPTO siding with the trolls and hedge funds whose sole innovation is in abusing the U.S. legal system, instead of the manufacturers, designers, and developers whose innovation really drives the economy?

Josh Landau

Patent Counsel, CCIA

Joshua Landau is the Patent Counsel at the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), where he represents and advises the association regarding patent issues.  Mr. Landau joined CCIA from WilmerHale in 2017, where he represented clients in patent litigation, counseling, and prosecution, including trials in both district courts and before the PTAB.

Prior to his time at WilmerHale, Mr. Landau was a Legal Fellow on Senator Al Franken’s Judiciary staff, focusing on privacy and technology issues.  Mr. Landau received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and his B.S.E.E. from the University of Michigan.  Before law school, he spent several years as an automotive engineer, during which time he co-invented technology leading to U.S. Patent No. 6,934,140.

Follow @PatentJosh on Twitter.

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